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THE NEW PROPERTY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN CONCEPT OF PROPERTY
KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE*
INTRODUCTION
"There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination
and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property
.... " wrote William Blackstone in 1765.1 Two centuries after
Blackstone wrote, Charles Reich's highly influential article "The
New Property,"2 argued that property is the indispensable founda-
tion of the free individual in the modern welfare state.$ While the
concept of property has been central to the development of both
public4 and private law during the history of the United States, the
meaning of the term "property" has changed radically. This essay
will trace the main transformations of the concept of property
from the Revolutionary period to the modern period. The intro-
duction will present both the methodology and the thesis of the
essay. Following the introduction, the essay will examine the devel-
opment of the concept of property in three stages. First, the Black-
stonian conception of property, prevalent at the founding of the
nation, will be described by focusing on two elements of Black-
stone's theory: the physicalist 5 conceptions and the absolutist con-
ceptions. Next, the general transformation of each of these ele-
ments during the nineteenth century will be described and
* J.D. 1979 Harvard Law School; Associate, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman,
Washington, D.C. I wish to thank Professor Duncan M. Kennedy of the Harvard Law
School, whose generous sharing of his power of insight made this essay possible.
1. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIMS (1765).
2. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
3. The article was cited as authority by the U.S. Supreme Court in the landmark case
of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). It also has become a staple part of the teach-
ing of property law in the United States. See, e.g., C. HAA & L. LEBMAN, PROPERTY AND
LAW 1027-1126 (1977).
4. For a general discussion of the importance of property to eighteenth century revolu-
tionary thought, see Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REv.
691, 712-14 (1938).
5. See text accompanying notes 19-25 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 26-32 infra.
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illustrated through an analysis of the law of business goodwill, ac-
cession, trademarks, oil and gas, and trade secrets. Finally, the
changes in the physicalist and absolutist conceptions of property
will be shown to form the basis of the modern concept of property
as defined by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld.
A. Methodology
American legal historiography, as it has evolved in this cen-
tury, has been concerned primarily with the problem of explaining
which among various historical forces "caused" a particular judi-
cial decision.7 The method used in this essay stands entirely
outside this conventional approach to American legal history.
Rather than attempting to explain the cause of particular deci-
sions, it attempts to describe the structure of legal thought.8 The
difference lies both in using a purely descriptive rather than ex-
planatory approach, and in examining the structure of an entire
conceptual scheme rather than the outcomes of particular deci-
sions. The effort is not to explain why a particular side won on a
given day, but to describe the conceptual apparatus by which the
court justified its decision.
Central to the discussion among legal historians interested in
causation has been the debate over the extent to which the law is
autonomous,9 a debate which is epitomized by the opposing views
of the formalists and the instrumentalists. 0 At one end of the
spectrum, the formalist explains all legal decisions as logical de-
ductions from previous decisions,11 and therefore legal thought ex-
plains everything. At the other end of the spectrum, the instru-
7. See, e.g., Feinman, Book Review, 78 MICH. L. REv. 722 (1980).
8. The method employed herein owes a great deal to the work of Duncan Kennedy,
especially as exemplified in his article The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28
BUFFALO L. Rlv. 209 (1979). I am also heavily indebted to his magnificent essay, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
9. See, e.g., Tushnet, Perspectives on the Development of American Law: A Critical
Review of Friedman's "A History of American Law," 1977 Wis. L. REv. 81 (1977) for an
argument in support of the law's "relative autonomy." See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERIcAN LAw (1973) for an argument against the autonomy of law.
10. See, e.g., Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the "Relative
Autonomy" of the Law, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 571 (1977); Klare, Judicial Deradicalization
of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L.
REv. 265 (1977).
11. The tenets of formalism are described in Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. OF LEGAL
STUD. 351 (1973). See also R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976).
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mentalist sees legal thought as but a diversion, a sideshow
produced merely to justify decisions made entirely for political rea-
sons. 12 But regardless of whether one sees legal thought as a de-
pendent or an independent variable in the study of legal history,
legal thought clearly is of crucial importance to that study; within
it lies the secret of how the deception was made convincing. Until
that is understood, attempts at unmasking the law are necessarily
incomplete. This essay, then, begins with the conviction that legal
historians, whatever their beliefs about causation in history, need
to understand the nature of legal thought and therefore an initial
effort at description is justified.
Legal thought is, in essence, the process of categorization. The
lawyer is taught to place phenomena into categories such as fact or
law, substance or process, public or private, contract or tort, and
foreseeable or unforeseeable, to name but a few. Categorizing phe-
nomena determines how they will be treated by the legal system.
Whether, as with the formalist, the process of placement is seen as
mechanical, or, as with the instrumentalist, the process is seen as
politically motivated, the process is the core of legal thought.1"
The task of the legal historian who examines American legal
thought is to explore the origins and structure of the categories.
This essay explores the origins and structure of the category of
property. Although the language of causation is used occasionally,
the question of what caused the shift from a Blackstonian concep-
tion of property to a Hohfeldian conception is largely ignored. In-
stead, the attempt is to describe the two conceptions of property
and the process by which one conception was abandoned and the
other adopted.
The selection of the concept of property as the subject of this
initial exploration was deliberate.14 American legal thought since
the Revolutionary period has been dominated by the idea of liber-
alism, broadly defined.1" One characteristic of liberalism has been
12. A good example of instrumentalism in its extreme form is L. FRIEDMAN, supra note
9, at 10.
13. See generally Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory: Three Essays in Adjudication
and Politics, 28 BUFFALo L. REV. 383 (1979); Kennedy, supra note 8.
14. Similar investigations of legal concepts include Frug, The City as a Legal Concept,
93 HARv. L. REv. 1959 (1980) and Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the
Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of Property, Contract and Tort, 93 HARv. L.
REv. 1511 (1980).
15. The theory of liberalism, its relationship to politics and psychology, and its dilem-
1980] 327
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the dualism of the state and the individual. All of the important
problems in a liberal legal system can be stated as a choice be-
tween state power and individual freedom. The choice is bewilder-
ing because state power is seen both as the indispensable condition
to the existence of freedom and as the chief threat to that free-
dom.116 The categories of legal thought mark the boundaries be-
tween state power and individual freedom. The process of categori-
zation, in effect, is the process of choosing between the state and
the individual in particular cases. Property has played a critical
role in the scheme of legal categories. Property and its counterpart,
sovereignty, have been understood as generic terms for, respec-
tively, the collection of freedoms held by the individual and the
collection of powers held by the state. In very real terms, the con-
cept of property has marked the boundaries of individual freedom
and the limits of state power.
Thus, the choice between state power and individual freedom
in particular cases repeatedly has been stated in legal terms as the
decision whether property exists. The study of the development of
the concept of property should reveal something about the process
by which this fundamental choice has been made during the course
of American history. A glimmer of insight into this process of cate-
gorization-the process which constitutes American legal
thought-is the goal of this essay.
B. Thesis
In broad outline, the thesis is this: at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, property was ideally defined as absolute do-
minion over things. Exceptions to this definition suffused property
law: instances in which the law declared property to exist even
though no "thing" was involved or the owner's dominion over the
thing was not absolute. Each of these exceptions, however, was ex-
plained away. Where no "thing" existed, one was fictionalized.
Where dominion was not absolute, limitations could be camou-
flaged by resorting to fictions, or rationalized as inherent in the
nature of the thing or the owner. The result was a perception that
mas are described in R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975) and R. UNGER, supra note
11.
16. For this view of liberalism and the following discussion of the relationship between
liberalism and the structure of legal thought, I am greatly indebted to the work of Kennedy,
supra note 8, and Unger, supra note 15.
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the concept of property rested inevitably in the nature of things
and that recognition of some thing as the object of property rights
offered a premise from which the owner's control over that thing
could be deduced with certainty. The perceived inevitability of this
definition of property legitimated the concept. At the same time,
the serviceability of property as a premise from which legal rela-
tions could be deduced permitted courts to use the concept to fix
the boundaries of dominion between private individuals and be-
tween the individual and the state. Property law thug appeared to
settle controversies while simultaneously legitimating, and even
necessitating, the result.
As the nineteenth century progressed, increased exceptions to
both the physicalist and the absolutist elements of Blackstone's
conception of property were incorporated into the law. Acting at
times on a theory of natural law and at other times on the instru-
mentalist public policy of a positive state, courts increasingly
sought to protect valuable interests as property even though no
thing was involved. The protection of value rather than
things-the dephysicalization of property-greatly broadened the
purview of property law. Any valuable interest potentially could be
declared the object of property rights. This dephysicalization was a
development that threatened to place the entire corpus of Ameri-
can law in the category of property. Such conceptual imperialism
created severe problems for the courts. First, if every valuable in-
terest constituted property, then practically any act would result in
either a trespass on, or a taking of, someone's property, especially
if property still was regarded as absolute. Second, once property
had swallowed the rest of American law, its meaningfulness as a
separate category would disappear. On the other hand, if certain
valuable interests were not to be considered property, finding and
justifying the criteria for separating property from nonproperty
would be difficult. The sense of inevitability in the definition of
property had disintegrated and with it the legitimacy of the con-
cept of property.
The absolutist conception of property also came under assault.
Throughout the nineteenth century, courts discovered that inter-
ests which deserved protection, whether based on natural law or
positive instrumentalism, could not be protected absolutely with-
out unduly restricting the activity of others. Courts created less
protected forms of property, but once they admitted that all prop-
1980]
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erty was not equally protected, the designation of an interest as
property no longer provided a premise from which legal rights
could be automatically deduced. The designation of an interest as
property no longer settled any controversy; it merely restated the
dispute. Courts, therefore, were faced with the dilemma of finding
and justifying criteria for deciding upon the protection to which a
particular species of property was entitled.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Blackstonian
conception of property was no longer credible. A new conception
emerged and was stated in its definitive form by Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld. This new property was defined as a set of legal relations
among persons. Property was no longer defined as dominion over
things. Moreover, property was no longer absolute, but limited,
with the meaning of the term varying from case to case.
The new conception of property failed to solve the problems
left by the destruction of the Blackstonian conception. Courts still
had to decide whether a particular interest was property, and if it
was, how much protection it merited. Nevertheless, the Hohfeld
conception provided a vocabulary for discussion that was consis-
tent with the new dephysicalized and limited property.
This century long evolution resulted in an inability of prop-
erty concepts to settle controversies and to legitimate the results.
Courts overcame their paralysis by deciding individual cases with
overt recourse to political goals. But, in so doing, they abandoned
the myth of judicial neutrality and with it their own legitimacy.
This evolution illustrates the general transformation of legal rea-
soning. It is the story of a radical reconceptualization in a crucial
area of American law that brought with it the destruction of the
legitimacy of law that the Realist movement bequeathed to Ameri-
can legal thought.1 7
I. OLD PROPERTY: THE BLACKSTONIAN CONCEPTION
The common law conception of property at the end of the
eighteenth century was embodied in Sir William Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England, published in 1765.18 That
17. See Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the
Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. Rv. 459 (1979).
18. The "chorus of approbation" that greeted Blackstone's publication of the Commen-
taries and the subsequent influence of that work, are described in Odgers, SIR WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 27 YALE L.J. 599 (1918); 28 YALE L.J. 542 (1919).
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conception saw property as absolute dominion over things. In
Blackstone's words, property was "that sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe." 19 Blackstone's definition contained essentially two ele-
ments: (1) the physicalist conception of property that required
some "external thing" to serve as the object of property rights, and
(2) the absolutist conception which gave the owner "sole and des-
potic dominion" over the thing.
A. The Physicalist Conception of Property
Blackstone divided all legal rights into two categories: rights
over persons and rights over things. The law of property concerned
only the latter.20 Under the physicalist concept the law of property
was based on a taxonomy of things, with the nature of each thing
determining its treatment at law. The basic distinction made was
between real property and personal property and was based on a
fundamental difference in the things which served as the basis of
property rights. Real things were fixed and immovable, such as
land and tenements, while personal things were movable, such as
goods and money.
These two categories were subdivided. Things real were di-
vided into corporeal hereditaments-things which could be de-
tected by the senses, and incorporeal hereditaments 21-things
which existed only "in contemplation. '22 A corporeal hereditament
was simply land. An incorporeal hereditament was "a right issuing
out of a thing corporate"2 and fell into one of the following cate-
gories: advowsons, tithes, commons, ways, offices, dignities,
franchises, corodies, annuities, and rents.24 Incorporeal heredita-
ments presented a conceptual problem for Blackstone since the
holder of such property held no thing, only a right, albeit a right
issuing from a thing. Blackstone solved the problem by reifying
these rights; they became "things" even if only "in
19. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs 2.
20. Id. at 15.
21. A hereditament is "whatsoever may be inherited." Id. at 17.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 19.
24. Id. at 21.
1980]
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contemplation.""8
Personal property, also was divided into two categories: in pos-
session and in action. Chattels personal in possession consisted of
actual possession of some thing while chattels personal in action,
or choses in action, consisted only of the right to hold the thing in
possession at some future time.2" As Blackstone put it, a chose in
action was a "thing rather in potentia than in esse."27
Like 'the corporeal/incorporeal hereditaments distinction, the
distinction between things in possession and choses in action illus-
trates Blackstone's insistence upon property as things. Just as
Blackstone reified incorporeal hereditaments, he reified choses in
action. A chose in action was a thing in potentia, but a thing
nonetheless.
Blackstone's conception of property as dominion over things
was maintained only at the expense of intellectual integrity. Call-
ing a right a thing did not make it one. Furthermore, if rights were
things, then all legal rights could be considered property and
Blackstone's fundamental distinction between rights over persons
and rights over things was destined to evaporate.
B. The Absolutist Conception of Property
Blackstone considered property to be one of three "absolute
right[s], inherent in every Englishman."28 So absolute were the
rights or property, according to Blackstone, that the law would not
permit the smallest infringement of them, even for the good of the
entire community.29
Blackstone's absolutist conception of property, like his physi-
calist conception, could be maintained only through a set of
fictions. The common law recognized numerous instances of lim-
ited property. Blackstone used two separate strategies for recon-
ciling the exceptions: one for tangible things and one for reified
25. Pollock and Maitland, describing incorporeal hereditaments, observed: "They are
thinglike rights and their thinglikeness is of their very essence." 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 123 (1898).
26. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 389.
27. Id. at 397.
28. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 134. The other absolute rights were life and
liberty.
29. Id. at 135.
[Vol. 29
DEVELOPING PROPERTY CONCEPTS
rights.30
Where some tangible thing was involved, Blackstone consid-
ered any limitations in the owner's dominion to be inherent in the
nature of the thing or the owner. For example, animals ferae
naturae31 presented an example of qualified property because their
nature did not permit absolute dominion over them.2
Where no tangible thing was involved, as in the case of incor-
poreal hereditaments and choses in action, Blackstone used his re-
ified rights fiction to preserve the absolutist conception of prop-
erty. Blackstone considered the incorporeal hereditament and the
chose in action to be the thing which was the object of the prop-
erty rights. Thus, one who had a chose in action or an incorporeal
hereditament had absolute dominion over a thing. The limited
property right had been reified, and the resulting thing was owned
absolutely.
I1. THE CREATION OF NEW PROPERTY
A. The Dephysicalization of Property
The courts of Blackstone's era claimed to be protecting the
possession of things. If no physical thing was possessed, as with an
incorporeal hereditament or a chose in action, one was fictional-
ized. Courts in the nineteenth century continually encountered sit-
uations in which the protection of some intangible form of wealth
was far more important to the litigants than the protection of any
tangible thing in the case. Whatever their motive or justification in
finding property, courts frequently found that protecting the pos-
session of a tangible thing rather than intangible wealth was point-
less if not counterproductive." Too often there simply was no
thing to be protected. Courts thus began to define property as the
right to value rather than to some thing.
This tendency to create nonphysical forms of property was en-
couraged by changes in the structures of two bodies of legal doc-
trine: the adoption of the fourteenth amendment and changes in
30. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 389.
31. Translated to mean "animals of a wild nature."
32. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 389. In this category of qualified property, Black-
stone also placed air, light, fire and water. Property which was qualified because of the
peculiar circumstances of the owner included bailments, goods pawned upon a condition,
and goods distreined for rent. Id. at 395-96.
33. See text accompanying notes 38-67 infra.
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equity jurisprudence. First the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment protected citizens against deprivation of life, liberty,
or property by the State. New as well as old forms of wealth could
thus be protected against state infringement if courts could be pur-
suaded to treat them as property. This encouraged the rapid crea-
tion of nonphysical forms of property.34 Second was the rule in eq-
uity that had been established, originally as dictum in the 1818
case of Gee v. Pritchard,3 5 that equity would act to protect only
property rights, not personal rights. Thus, the only way that equity
could protect valuable interests was to designate them as property.
One late nineteenth century commentator noted the court's chang-
ing attitude toward equity's protection of property:
The principle, followed so long by courts of equity, that Chancery interferes
only to protect rights of property, has recently lost much of its vigor because
the courts, though often professing allegiance to the rule, have stretched the
term "property" almost beyond recognition in the effort to do justice in the
constantly arising situations where personal and political rights demand ade-
quate protection. Accordingly, the injunctive method of abating nuisances,
originally designed to prevent injuries to property, has been used where what
was actually protected was the individual's personal comfort, health, or
safety."8
This commentator listed rights in dead bodies, unpublished pri-
vate letters, and privacy as examples of newly created property
rights. 37
The collective effect of these developments was the creation of
numerous species of nonphysical property such as business good-
will and accession. Courts gradually recognized that the value 'of
business goodwill was not necessarily linked to the premises, or to
any tangible incidents of the business. This recognition led to a
decision by the courts that property in goodwill could exist and be
alienated even though unattached to a thing. The law of accession
presents a slightly different situation. In all the accession cases, the
disputants agreed that a thing was the object of the controversy.
However, one side would claim that the property rights were in the
original possessor of the thing while the other side would claim
that the property rights were in the one who had contributed the
34. For a seminal discussion of the creation of nonphysical forms of property under the
due process clause, see J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924).
35. 2 Swanst. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818).
36. 7 COLUM. L. REv. 533 (1907) (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 533-34. See also 19 COLUM. L. REv. 413 (1919).
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most value to the thing. By the end of the nineteenth century the
courts no longer conceived of property rights as relative to the
thing; they concluded that, as in business goodwill, legal property
rights of property protected the value rather than the thing. Other
forms of nonphysical property were created to develop new prop-
erty rights where no tangible thing was involved in order to protect
the value of an investment, such as trademarks and trade secrets.
These four examples of dephysicalization of property suggest the
diverse approaches used by nineteenth century courts. In the case
of business goodwill, there was a gradual abandonment of the need
for the tangible things which had supported that property right. In
the law of accession, a thing remained the object of the dispute,
but the nature of the thing ceased to affect the resolution of the
dispute. Finally, in trademarks and trade secrets, courts created
property where no tangible thing existed. All these paths led to the
same destination: the dephysicalization of property. Property was
no longer solely rights over things, but rights to any valuable
interest.
1. Business Goodwill The tendency of early nineteenth cen-
tury courts to conceive of property as rights in some thing was re-
flected in the classic definition of goodwill furnished by Lord
Eldon in Cruttwell v. Lye:$s "nothing more than the probability,
that the old customers will resort to the old place." 9 This early
definition of goodwill considered it an incident of real property.40
Courts gradually began to realize, however, that in many cases the
value of the goodwill was unrelated to the location of the business.
In Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co.,41 for example,
after the St. Louis Evening Post Company merged with the St.
Louis Dispatch Company to form the Post-Dispatch the court held
that the Post-Dispatch did not own the goodwill of the St. Louis
Dispatch, even though it owned the place where the St. Louis Dis-
patch had been published. The court explained: "As applied to a
newspaper, the goodwill usually attaches to its name rather than to
the place of publication. The probability of the title continuing to
38. 17 Ves. Jun. 335, 34 Eng. Rep. 129 (1810).
39. Id. at 346, 34 Eng. Rep. at 133.
40. See, e.g., Rawson v. Pratt, 91 Ind. 9 (1883) (goodwill is an incident of a place of
business). See also Elliot's Appeal, 60 Pa. 161 (1869) (goodwill of an inn does not exist apart
from the building).
41. 149 U.S. 436 (1893).
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attract customers in the way of circulation and advertising pa-
tronage, gives a value which may be protected and disposed of, and
constitutes property. ' 42 The Metropolitan Bank court viewed
goodwill as being attached to value rather than things. The grow-
ing rejection of a physicalist conception of property in goodwill was
also reflected in Washburn v. National Wallpaper Co.,43 where the
court observed that goodwill is not "indissolubly connected" with a
particular location or a specific set of objects and that a firm could
retain its goodwill even though it moved to a new location and
bought new equipment. 4 Goodwill did not attach to any tangible
part of the business, but rather to the business as a going concern.
By the turn of the century, the courts were ready to take the
final step: goodwill need not be appurtenant to any thing. For ex-
ample, in Brett v. Ebel,45 a man transferred the goodwill of his
freighting business by agreeing not to solicit his old customers. The
court held that this was a valid transfer of goodwill, even though
no physical objects had changed hands. 4" The goodwill transferred
in Brett differed from the goodwill in St. Louis Dispatch and
Washburn in that the former involved a covenant not to compete
while the latter involved only the sale of a business. The doctrinal
breakthrough of Brett, however, that property can exist in goodwill
without reference to any physical thing, cannot be attributed solely
to the fact that a covenant not to compete need not involve the
transfer of tangible objects. In fact, prior to Brett, a covenant not
to compete was invalid unless it was supported by consideration in
the form of some tangible thing, because goodwill alone, not being
property, would not be adequate consideration. 47 The new Brett
rule was applied and justified in Rowe v. Toon where the court
explained that a covenant not to compete often created a "valuable
42. Id. at 446.
43. 81 F. 17 (2d Cir. 1897).
44. Id. at 20.
45. 29 A.D. 256, 51 N.Y.S. 573 (1st Dep't 1898).
46. Id. at 258, 51 N.Y.S. at 574; accord, Rowe v. Toon, 185 Iowa 848, 169 N.W. 38
(1918).
47. See, e.g., Pickett v. Green, 120 Ind. 584, 22 N.E. 737 (1889) where the covenant not
to compete by a retiring physician was appurtenant to the sale of "1 table, 1 office chair,
with book rest, 1 reclining chair, with cane bottom and back, 6 common chairs, 1 prescrip-
tion case, I book-case, 1 stove, with pipe, 1 side-lamp, 1 oil can, 1 slate. . ." 120 Ind. at 585,
22 N.E. at 738. See also Rowe v. Toon, 185 Iowa 848, 169 N.W. 38 (1818), citing the once
general rule that a covenant not to compete is valid only if made in connection with the
transfer of property.
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opportunity."4 This value could be the object of property rights in
goodwill, and nothing more than this value was needed as consid-
eration for the contract.
The movement toward a rule that goodwill could constitute
property without the existence of a tangible thing was facilitated
by attempts to abstract a general theory of goodwill from the cases.
One effect of this process of abstraction was to divert attention
from the physical thing involved in a particular goodwill case and
to focus discussion on the general nature of the legal relationships
created through a transfer of goodwill. This seemed to give good-
will a separate existence apart from things. Another effect of ab-
stracting the concept of goodwill was a realization that, in many
respects, goodwill resembled traditional forms of property and
should, therefore, be treated as property.
In 1875, A.S. Biddle published one of the first comprehensive
treatments of the concept of goodwill in American legal litera-
ture.4 9 He criticized Lord Eldon's definition of goodwill for being
too narrow and adopted Joseph Story's more comprehensive defi-
nition.50 Biddle reviewed the case law, and perceiving it to be suf-
fused with conflicting and confused decisions,51 attempted to for-
mulate a set of general principles to govern the law of goodwill. He
focused on the alienability of goodwill and its protection in equity,
and concluded that goodwill was "a species of incorporeal person-
alty... subject with but few exceptions to the general laws which
regulate that kind of property. '52
Eight years later, Adelbert Hamilton also set out to collect the
authorities and state the "general principles" of goodwill.53 Em-
phasizing the alienability of goodwill,54 Hamilton also adopted
48. 185 Iowa at 855, 169 N.W. at 41.
49. Biddle, Goodwill, 14 AM. L. REG. 1 (1875).
50. Story defined goodwill as:
the advantage or benefit which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the
mere value of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed therein, in conse-
quence of the general public patronage and encouragement which it receives
from constant or habitual customers on account of its local position, or common
celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence or punctuality, or from other acci-
dental circumstances or necessity or even from ancient partialities or prejudices.
J. STORY, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 99 (1841).
51. Id.
52. Biddle, supra note 49, at 8.
53. Hamilton, Good-Will, 15 Fed. 315 (1883).
54. Id. at 316.
1980]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Story's definition of goodwill as the best available and concurred in
Biddle's characterization of goodwill as incorporeal personalty. In
an attempt to capture the essence of goodwill, Hamilton stated
that "[g]oodwill denotes a relation existing between a man or firm
and the public with reference to a particular business." 55 He began
to conceive of goodwill as creating relations between people, not
between people and things.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the commentators
had lost interest in classifying goodwill as a particular species of
property, such as incorporeal personalty."" One writer, for example,
concluded that goodwill was of pecuniary value and was assignable,
and, having these two "essential attributes of property," should be
considered property.57 Four years later, another student author
stated as a premise the proposition that his predecessor had
reached as conclusion: "Goodwill is generally recognized to be a
form of property." 58 The transition had become clear; goodwill
though entirely nonphysical had become property. Later discus-
sions of goodwill in legal literature made no attempt to place it in
any category of property.59 Perhaps it made little sense to the com-
mentators to attempt to fit a dephysicalized form of property into
a scheme which was based on a taxonomy of things.
2. Accession The common law rule of accession from the
time of Blackstone until the 1870's was that if one altered goods
owned by another, causing their physical identity to be lost, yet in
good faith was ignorant that the things belonged to another, then
the ownership of the goods would pass from the original owner to
the person who performed the alteration. The original owner would
simply be entitled to compensation. If the alteration did not
change the physical identity of the goods, then the original owner
would retain his title and the interloper would have no interest in
the goods.60 This rule was readily accepted by American courts
throughout the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century.61
55. Id.
56. This was the same time as courts like the Brett court were upholding the transfer of
goodwill unsupported by the transfer of any physical objects.
57. 16 H v. L. REv. 135, 136 (1902).
58. 19 HRv. L. REv. 538 (1906).
59. See, e.g., 3 CoLuM. L. Rzv. 210 (1903); 29 HRv. L. REv. 457 (1915); 19 COLUM. L.
REv. 413 (1919); 31 YALE L.J. 209 (1921); 34 YALE L.J. 101 (1924).
60. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, Cowmrrmns 404.
61. See, e.g., Lampton's Exec. v. Preston's Exec., 24 Ky. (1 J.J. Marsh) 454 (1828);
[Vol. 29
DEVELOPING PROPERTY CONCEPTS
As a result of this rule, once the error of the taking was discov-
ered, the appropriator of the goods that retained their physical
identity would lose any investment made in improving the goods.
A desire to protect t value of the interloper's investment led to
the creation of a new rule. In Wetherbee v. Green,6 2 decided in
1871, the defendant had taken timber which he erroneously be-
lieved he owned, and converted it into barrel hoops worth twenty-
eight times more than the timber. In passing upon the timber own-
er's action for replevin of the wood, Judge Cooley reviewed the ex-
tensive authority for the physical identity rule, and concluded that
a determination based solely on whether the new product was
identifiable from the original thing taken was contrary to the goal
of protecting the value of investment.6 s He held that title should
be determined by the relative amount each claimant had contrib-
uted to the final product.6 Since the appropriator's contribution to
the final value of the hoops was twenty-eight times greater than
that of the original owner, the latter's action for replevin was de-
nied leaving him with an action for damages in the amount of the
value of the original timber.
The comparative value rule established by Wetherbee quickly
began to supplant the physical identity rule in other jurisdic-
tions.05 Some courts went so far as to hold that when the appropri-
ator's contribution to the value of the goods exceeded that of the
original owner, the original owner would be limited to damages for
the goods taken even where the appropriator acted wilfully and
Baldwin v. Porter, 12 Conn. 473, 484 (1838); Silsbury & Calkins v. McCoon & Sherman, 6
Hill 425 (Sup. Ct. 1844), rehearing denied 4 Denio 332 (Sup. Ct. 1847), rev'd on other
grounds 3 N.Y. 379 (1850); Riddle v. Driver, 12 Ala. 590 (1847); Reader v. Moody, 48 N.C. (3
Jones) 11 (1856); Potter v. Marde, 74 N.C. 36 (1876).
62. 22 Mich. 311 (1871).
63. Id. at 320.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Lewis v. Courtright, 77 Iowa 190, 41 N.W. 615 (1889) (defendant who, in
good faith, cut neighbor's grass worth 8 - 10 cents per acre and converted it to hay worth
$2.00 - 4.50 per acre, was granted title to the hay); Eaton v. Langley, 65 Ark. 448, 47 S.W.
123 (1898) (adopted the rule of Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311 (1871) and held that
where appropriator increases sixfold the value of lumber converted to railroad ties, the in-
crease was not enough to pass the title). In cases where the plaintiff sued not for recovery of
the goods, but for damages, the issue was whether the plaintiff was entitled to the full value
of the goods after their improvement, or merely the value of the goods when taken. Cases
holding that the plaintiff was entitled only to the value of the goods when taken include:
Herdic v. Young, 55 Pa. 176 (1867); Heard v. James, 49 Miss. 236 (1873); Texas & N.O. Ry.
Co., 34 Tex. Civ. App. 94, 77 S.W. 955 (1903).
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knowingly."' The rule inaugurated by Wetherbee was a stark rejec-
tion of the physicalist conception of property embodied in Black-
stone's Commentaries and in the cases decided prior to 1870. After
Wetherbee, property rights were annexed not to an identifiable ex-
ternal thing, but to value.67
B. Limiting of Property Rights
Courts in the nineteenth century began to extend property
protection to interests which previously had been protected only in
a very limited fashion or not at all. This section will examine two
such interests, trademarks and trade secrets. In 1800, trademarks
were protected only against fraud while trade secrets were not pro-
tected at all. Yet by the end of the nineteenth century, both were
considered property. Courts decided, however, that extending ab-
solute protection to these valuable interests was undesirable. With
trademarks, courts recognized that absolute protection of one
man's use of a trademark prevented even harmless use of the same
mark by others notwithstanding that others had invested substan-
tially in the use of the trademark. Faced with competing claims of
absolute property rights, the courts limited property protection by
limiting the categories of people against whom an infringement ac-
tion could be brought. In trade secret cases, courts realized that
absolute protection of trade secrets would vitiate the legislature's
patent policy of limiting the duration of an idea's protection. In
contrast with trademarks, which were originally protected in rem,
trade secrets received only limited protection from the moment of
their designation as property. The owner of the trade secret was
limited to bringing an action for violation of the secret only against
persons in breach of trust.
Limitations on absolute dominion were required also where
the property rights protected were not some newfangled "valuable
interest" such as a trade secret, but were a more traditional object
of property rights: a tangible thing. This section will examine one
such example, the law of oil and gas. These minerals had not been
of any legal interest in Blackstone's time and were not mentioned
66. See, e.g., Single v. Schneider, 24 Wis. 299 (1869); Carpenter v. Longenfelter, 42
Neb. 728, 60 N.W. 1022 (1894).
67. For a similar and contemporaneous shift in the law of trusts, see Williston, The
Right to Follow Trust Property When Confused With Other Property, 2 HARV. L. REv. 28
(1888).
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in his Commentaries. Nevertheless, minerals are things and it is
likely that Blackstone would have considered oil and gas to be ob-
jects of property, as he had other minerals. 8 Indeed, the earliest
oil and gas cases were argued by analogy to Blackstone. Courts rec-
ognized that granting absolute rights in oil and gas interfered with
the absolute rights of others who had access to the same mineral
pool. The result was again to limit property. This time, however,
the limitation was both a shift from protection in rem to protec-
tion against those who owned no land superadjacent to the mineral
pool, and a restriction of the owner's right of usufruct.
The examples of trademarks, trade secrets and oil and gas il-
lustrate the variety of situations in which limited property rights
were created. The object of the property to be limited might be a
tangible thing, such as oil, or an intangible thing, such as a secret.
The limitations sometimes occurred gradually, after an early pe-
riod of absolute protection, as with trademarks, or may have been
created simultaneously with the property rights, as with trade
secrets. The nature of the limitation varied and included limita-
tions on the number of persons against whom protection was avail-
able, as in trademark law, and on the uses to which the owner
might put the object of the property rights, as in oil and gas law.
The common element is that by the end of the nineteenth century
these various chapters in the law, multiplied a hundred times
throughout the corpus juris, made it impossible to believe Black-
stone's thesis that property rights were absolute.
1. Trademarks The first suggestion of affording protection
for a trademark came in Singleton v. Boulton,6 0 decided in 1783.
Lord Mansfield stated that if the defendant had sold medicine
under the plaintiff's name, an action for fraud would lie. The
plaintiff and defendant, however, both had sold the medicine
under the name of the inventor, who was not a party to the suit.
Since there was no evidence that the defendant had defrauded the
plaintiff, the court denied relief. Lord Mansfield considered pro-
tecting the trademark as property, but declined to do so because
the medicine had not been patented. Fraud provided only limited
protection for trademarks because no action would lie unless the
second user of the trademark intended to deceive the public.
68. 2 W. BLAcKSTONE, Comm1ARmu 18.
69. 3 Doug. 293, 99 Eng. Rep. 661 (1783).
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Mansfield stopped short of designating a trademark as absolute
property. To do so would have permitted recovery for any unau-
thorized use, regardless of the appropriator's state of mind. A half
century after Singleton, the courts were ready to view a trademark
as property and to afford it absolute protection. In the landmark
case of Millington v. Fox,7 0 a perpetual injunction was granted to
prevent one tradesman from using the trademark of another. For
the first time, a trademark was deemed to be property and was
protected against all infringement, even unintentional.
The conceptual change reflected in Millington did not win im-
mediate or universal acceptance. Four years later, in Perry v.
Truefitt,7" Lord Langdale questioned Millington's protection of
trademarks where there was no intent to deceive and noted that he
was unaware of any previous case that protected trademarks so ex-
tensively. He concluded that he did not think it possible to own
property in a name or mark, even if that name or mark was pro-
tectable against fraudulent use.72 Langdale's implicit assumption
was that property in a true Blacktonian sense meant absolute pro-
tection, and a mere right of protection against fraud did not mean
that a trademark was property and was entitled to this absolute
protection.
The American courts quickly followed the lead of their En-
glish counterparts. Prior to Millington, the decisions rested on
fraud. For example, in Thomson v. Winchester,73 decided in 1837,
an action in fraud was allowed in order to protect a trademark. A
shift in concept, similar to the one occuring in England, also can be
seen in Bell v. Locks,7 4 decided in 1840. There the court stated
that a newspaper's name would be protected from fraudulent ap-
propriation, even though the court found no fraud in the case. By
1844 the influence of Millington was felt in American courts. Tay-
lor v. Carpenter5 cited Millington for the principle that a perpet-
ual injunction would be issued to protect trademarks even in the
absence of fraudulent intent. Since the defendant in Taylor had
70. 3 My. & Cr. 338, 40 Eng. Rep. 956 (1838).
71. 6 Beav. 66, 49 Eng. Rep. 749 (1842).
72. Id. at 73, 49 Eng. Rep. at 752. See also Croft v. Day, 7 Beav. 84, 49 Eng. Rep. 994
(1843).
73. 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 214 (1837).
74. 8 Paige Ch. 75 (N.Y. 1840).
75. 11 Paige Ch. 292 (N.Y. 1844).
[Vol. 29
DEVELOPING PROPERTY CONCEPTS
admitted fraudulent intent, the reference to Millington was only
dictum. However, the following year, in Coats v. Nelson Holbrook
& Co.,7 6 the same New York court perpetually enjoined the in-
fringement of a trademark. Citing Millington, the court held that
the fraudulent intent of the defendant was relevant only to the
determination of costs. Two years later, the New York chancery
court decided a trademark case without even mentioning the in-
tent of the defendant. 7 Rather, the court proceeded on the ground
that the defendant had a "valuable interest" in the mark which
entitled it to protection.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the idea of protect-
ing trademarks as property had gained broad acceptance. Trade-
marks were afforded the absolute protection associated with
property:
[The trademark is property, and the owner's right of property in it is as
complete as that which he possesses in the goods to which he attaches it, and
the law protects him in the enjoyment of the one as fully as of the other
.... The right is not limited in its enjoyment by territorial bounds, but
subject only to such statutory regulations as may be properly made concern-
ing the use and enjoyment of other property ... the proprietor may assert
and maintain his property right, wherever the common law affords remedies
for wrongs.78
The absolute right of property in trademarks was affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court in the Trade-Mark Cases " of 1879.
The Court announced both that the proprietor of a trademark had
a right to exclusive use of the mark and denominated that right a
property right. Recognizing the absolute nature of trademark prop-
erty, the Supreme Court observed in Kidd v. Johnson" that the
right to use a trademark was not limited to any place, but ex-
tended "everywhere." 81
The move to create absolute property in trademarks was not
without its skeptics. Francis Upton, in his 1860 treatise on trade-
marks, commented that an exclusive right to anything was a mo-
nopoly and thus a restraint on the individual's freedom of trade.82
76. 2 Sand. Ch. 586 (N.Y. 1845).
77. Partridge v. Menck, 2 Barb. Ch. 101, 103 (N.Y. 1847).
78. Derringer v. Plate, 29 Cal. 292, 295 (1865).
79. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
80. 100 U.S. 617 (1879).
81. Id. at 619.
82. F. UPTON, A TRFATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADEmARKS 88-89 (Albany 1860).
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Upton observed that the aversion to creating monopolies had
rightly given way to the important public policy of commercial de-
velopment, but he warned that the doctrine of exclusive property
in trademarks should be applied "with the extremest caution."83
The solution adopted for this problem was not to limit property,
but to restrict the types of symbols that could become the objects
of absolute property rights. Therefore, by 1872, the courts had al-
most uniformly reduced the restrictions on commerce inherent in
making trademarks property by adopting a set of restrictions re-
garding the kinds of marks which could be protected as property.
The trademark had to be distinctive, i.e., readily identified with
the maker of the goods to which it was attached. Additionally, the
trademark could not be a geographic name, generic name, or a
name which merely described the article, its ingredients or quali-
ties." These restrictions were calculated to extend absolute protec-
tion only to those marks which were least likely to interfere with
the activities of others.
This paradigmatic trademark scheme which defined two clas-
ses-marks with absolute protection and marks with no protec-
tion-began to crumble as the turn of the century approached.
The leading case which eroded the boundaries of the two discrete
categories was American Waltham Watch Co. v. U.S. Watch Co..85
For many years, the plaintiff had manufactured watches in Wal-
tham, Mass., identified by the word "Waltham," and had acquired
a great reputation for them. The defendant, with the apparent in-
tention of diverting some portion of the plaintiff's trade, began to
sell watches also bearing the name "Waltham." When the plaintiff
brought an action for trademark infringement, the defendant re-
plied that the plaintiff's choice to identify his product by a city
name was his folly since he could not be given a monopoly on a
geographic name. The court held that the word "Waltham,"
though originally used in its geographic sense, had over time ac-
quired a secondary meaning which the court would protect. This
secondary meaning doctrine could have expanded trademark pro-
tection to every symbol or word in which anyone had invested
value. Instead, the courts created a new category of partial protec-
83. Id. at 96.
84. See Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 U.S. (Wall) 311, 323-24 (1871).
85. 173 Mass. 85, 53 N.E. 141 (1899).
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tion initially known as "cases analogous to trademarks" and later
called "trade names" or referred to under the general. rubric of
"unfair competition." The difference between the two protected
categories was this: trademarks were property and, as such, were
protected in rem. Trade names, on the other hand, were not prop-
erty, and were protected only against particular individuals to pre-
vent fraud in particular cases.8 6
With the decision in American Waltham Watch, history had
come nearly full circle. The courts had gone from allowing injunc-
tions only in the case of fraud, to providing absolute property pro-
tection for trademarks, and to providing limited protection for
trade names in Sartor v. Schader.87 After repeating the traditional
distinction between trademarks and trade names," the court shat-
tered the absolutist conception of property in trademarks. It
stated: "In this secondary meaning there may be a property
right."89 Two years later a Massachusetts case, Cohen v. Nagle90
also recognized trade names as a limited form of property. The
plaintiff had adopted the trade name "Keystone," which he readily
agreed was a geographic name and of such common use that it
could not be a trademark. Nevertheless, the court held that the
infusion of value by the plaintiff into the word "Keystone" made it
a form of property. The rights attached to this property, however,
gave the owner no exclusive right to the use of the property. The
courts had changed the meaning of property in closing the circle.
By creating limited property, the courts essentially robbed the
term "property" of its meaning. Designating a symbol as property
now could mean either that it would be protected absolutely or
that it would be protected only against fraud. Since protection
against fraud had been available before the creation of property in
trademarks or trade names, designating a symbol as property as in
Sartor and Cohen did not say anything new about it or the protec-
tion that might or might not be afforded it. Judicial recognition
that the meaning of "property" had been destroyed, was clearly
86. See Cushing, On Certain Cases Analogous to Trade-Marks, 4 HRv. L. REv. 321
(1891); Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 36 YALE L.J.
351, 374 (1927); Lane, Development of Secondary Rights in Trade-Mark Cases, 18 YALE
L.J. 571 (1909); 6 COLuM. L. Rev. 349 (1906).
87. 125 Iowa 696, 101 N.W. 511 (1904).
88. Id. at 700, 101 N.W. at 513.
89. Id.
90. 190 Mass. 4, 76 N.E. 276 (1906).
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evidenced in Judge Loring's concurring opinion in Cohen:
... whether it is or is not correct to say that such a plaintiff has property in
such a word is not of consequence. If he has a right of property in such a
word, this right of property results from his right to prevent others from us-
ing it. His right to prevent others from using it does not result from his right
of property.' 1
Designating a trademark or trade name property no longer
stated a premise from which the rights of the parties could be au-
tomatically deduced. Recognition of limited property meant that
the concept of property had lost its power to decide cases, and the
rights of the parties would have to be determined some other way.
With the adoption of the concept of limited property rights in
trade names, courts began to discover good reasons for limiting the
absolute protection afforded to trademarks. The need to limit
trademark protection typically arose in a case where two parties, in
complete ignorance of each other's existence, adopted the same
trademark for the same product. As long as they operated in sepa-
rate markets, there was no practical problem even though the sec-
ond user technically was infringing upon the first user's absolute
right of property in the trademark. A dispute arose, however, when
the two products met in the same market. The United States Su-
preme Court was faced with the dilemma of either modifying the
first user's absolute right of property in the trademark or destroy-
ing the second user's innocent investment in the symbol in Hano-
ver Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf.9 2 The result was protection of the
second user's investment. The Court announced that the first user
now would be protected against only infringement in those mar-
kets where his trademark already had become known. The second
user was permitted to introduce the mark into any other market.
The Court reconciled this holding with the earlier Derringer and
Kidd cases, that had explicitly established trademark protection as
extending "everywhere," by stating that in those cases, the in-
fringement occurred in a market where the first user's mark al-
ready was known. Then, having demonstrated to its own satisfac-
tion that trademark protection had never really reached
everywhere, the Court added an interesting twist to property the-
ory. They noted that trademark property protection did not ex-
91. Id. at 18, 76 N.E. at 282 (citations omitted).
92. 240 U.S. 403 (1916). See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus, 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
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tend to markets where the first user had not made his mark known
because he was regarded as having abandoned his right of property
and was, therefore, estopped from asserting that right. Courts con-
tinued to claim that property was absolute, even if they would not
always permit the proprietor to assert his unlimited rights."
Limiting the once absolute property in trademarks threatened
to destroy the distinction between trademarks and trade names.
Once both were recognized as limited property, even though those
limitations were not identical, courts began to regard the distinc-
tions between trademarks and trade names as only technical."
Because trademarks and trade names had begun to shade into
each other, courts again had to decide how much protection a sym-
bol should receive whatever it was technically called. Hanover had
established the rule for the geographic extent of protection against
usage of the mark for the same product, but had left unresolved
the extent of protection against other products using the same
symbol in the same market. The criteria which had separated clas-
sic late nineteenth century trademarks from other symbols had re-
quired trademarks to be distinctive names associated with particu-
lar products and excluded geographic, descriptive or generic
names. Courts in the early twentieth century adopted the same cri-
teria for deciding how much protection a mark or name would re-
ceive. The more a symbol resembled a classic trademark, the more
protection it would be given.95 The difference between 1875 and
1925 then was that discrete categories had yielded to a continuum.
For example, in Pease v. Scott County Milling Co.," the district
court noted that distinctive names, such as "Kodak," "Budweiser,"
"Ford," and "Aunt Jemima," would be protected in all cases where
damage would be caused by unauthorized use, while names such as
"Blue Ribbon," or "Star" would be protected only against use on
similar products. Following similar reasoning, the Second Circuit
Court held in France Milling Co., Inc. v. Washburn-Crosby Co.,
93. 269 U.S. 372 (1926).
94. See Regis v. J.A. Jaynes & Co., 185 Mass. 458, 70 N.E. 480 (1904). The U.S. Su-
preme Court, for example, observed in American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372
(1926), that the precise difference between trademarks and trade names was not often mate-
rial since the law would protect either against appropriation of essentially the same
principles.
95. See Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trade-Mark Protection, 40 HRv. L. REv. 813
(1927).
96. 5 F.2d 524 (E.D. Mo. 1925).
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Inc., that the use of the nondistinctive name "Gold Medal"
would be given narrow protection against second users of the
name. This meant that marketing wheat flour under the name
Gold Medal was forbidden, but marketing pancake flour under
that name was allowed. The terms "trademark" and "trade name"
were tied to the concept of property and like the concept of prop-
erty they lost their power to determine results. Cases would be de-
cided, not by deducing legal rights from concepts, but by the policy
of protecting investors from injury.
2. Trade Secrets Limited property did not necessarily
evolve from absolute property as in the case of trademarks. Trade
secret cases present the situation in which property rights are lim-
ited from their inception. The earliest petitions for judicial protec-
tion of trade secrets were denied. Lord Eldon in Newberry v.
Janes98 denied a request for an injunction to restrain an appren-
tice from revealing a secret formula for medicine on the ground of
impossibility, since the only way the court could protect a secret
would be to learn it, and then there would be no secret. If there
were no secret, then the supposed ground for judicial intervention
would be absent. Precedent, however, would have supported a de-
cision to protect the trade secrets. In Smith v. Dickenson," an En-
glish case decided thirteen years earlier, the plaintiff had invented
an apparatus to girth saddles, which he intended to patent. He
sold his secret to the defendant in return for a promise not to di-
vulge it. The defendant promptly patented the invention, and the
plaintiff successfully brought an action for breach of the agree-
ment. Lord Eldon could have extended Smith to provide protec-
tion even where the secret was not to be patented, but he declined
to do so. As he explained in Williams v. Williams,100 a case factu-
ally similar to Newberry, the circumstances were different because
the future patentee in Smith would eventually disclose his secret,
while in Newberry and Williams no patent and therefore no disclo-
sure was impending.101 Only where disclosure was a condition of
the grant of protection would the court protect the secret.
Ironically, it was Lord Eldon who established the protection of
97. 7 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1925).
98. 2 Mer. 445, 35 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1817).
99. 3 Bos. & Pul. 630, 127 Eng. Rep. 339 (1804).
100. 3 Mer. 157, 36 Eng. Rep. 61 (1817).
101. 3 Mer. at 160, 36 Eng. Rep. at 62.
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nonpatentable trade secrets three years after Newberry and Wil-
liams. It is not clear whether the new protection resulted from a
change of heart or a change of facts. In Yovatt v. Winyard,10 2 the
inventor of a secret hired an employee to whom he refused to di-
vulge the secret. The employee nevertheless learned the secret sur-
reptitiously. The plaintiff sought an injunction against the use of
the secret by the employee, and distinguished Newberry and Wil-
liams by noting that the inventor in those cases had disclosed the
secret to the employee voluntarily, whereas in .Yovatt the employee
had learned the secret against the wishes of the employer. Al-
though the distinction did not resolve the dilemma of protecting a
secret without learning it, Lord Eldon granted the injunction. He
based his decision on a breach of trust, which would have been
equally applicable to the earlier cases in which the employees had
promised not to divulge the secret.
While Yovatt turned the tide in favor of protecting trade
secrets, it did not base the protection on any kind of property the-
ory. Two years later, in Bryson v. Whitehead,103 the defendant had
sold his business as a dyer to the plaintiff, complete with his valua-
ble trade secrets, and agreed not to practice the trade for twenty
years within fifty miles. The plaintiff sued for specific performance
of the agreement and the court granted the injunction holding that
a trader could sell a secret and then be bound by that agreement
not to use it."" The next year, the same court faced another trade
secret case and again protected the secret without referring to
property rights. In Green v. Folgham,10 5 the defendant conceded
that he had been given a secret formula for an ointment to be held
in trust for others, but had instead breached the trust. The court
ordered him to account for his profits from the sale of the oint-
ment. However, in its opinion, the court simply ignored the prece-
dent of Newberry, Williams, Yovatt, and Bryson and instead re-
lied entirely on the admitted breach of trust. The protection under
these decisions, like the early protection of trademarks from fraud,
was based more on preventing bad conduct by the defendant than
on affording the plaintiff absolute protection of his investment. It
was a limited protection and no court in the process of developing
102. 1 Jac. & W. 393, 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (1820).
103. 1 Sim. & St. 74, 57 Eng. Rep. 29 (1822).
104. Id. at 31.
105. 1 Sim & St. 398, 57 Eng. Rep. 159 (1823).
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this protection had declared such secrets to be the object of prop-
erty rights.
This common law protection of trade secrets created a resem-
blance between trade secrets and patents. Patent protection was
first enacted in 1793106 for the purpose of creating property rights
in an invention. In return for protection in rem, the inventor was
required to divulge the secret and to surrender all protection after
a certain number of years. Statutory patent law, however, influ-
enced ambivalently the development of the law of trade secrets.
The similarity between patented inventions and trade secrets sug-
gested that secrets could and should be protected as property. Yet,
the carefully legislated restrictions on patent rights under patent
law also suggested that trade secrets should not be considered ab-
solute property.
The differences and similarities between patents and trade
secrets in the years following the first trade secret cases were ex-
plained briefly by Williard Phillips in his 1837 treatise on patent
law: [T]he patent was property while the trade secret was not.
However, an inventor could assert a nonproperty interest in a
trade secret which, under certain circumstances, would be pro-
tected by law.1 7 Phillips' authority for the legal protection of trade
secrets was Smith v. Dickenson, which protected trade secrets in-
tended to be patented. It is not clear why he ignored Yovatt and
other cases establishing protection for trade secrets in the absence
of an intent to patent the secret.
Another commentator, Joseph Story, also noted the protection
afforded trade secrets in his 1836 treatise on equity jurisprudence,
acknowledging that equity would restrain a party from disclosing
secrets communicated to him in the course of a confidential em-
ployment.108 Story's authority was Yovatt v. Winyard, in which
Lord Eldon created protection for trade secrets not to be patented,
and two other English cases, Cholmondeley v. Clinton09 and Evitt
v. Price.110 Cholmondeley held that a lawyer could not change
sides in a case, because that would prejudice the first client's
106. T. FESSENDEN, LAW oF PATENTS 35 (1810).
107. W. PHILLIPS, LAW OF PATENTS 333, 340 (1837).
108. J. STORY, COMM NTAMRS ON EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE § 952 (1836).
109. 19 Ves. 261, 34 Eng. Rep. 515 (1815).
110. 1 Jac. & W. 394, 57 Eng. Rep. 659 (1827).
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secrets,"' while Evitt held that a lawyer's accountant was obli-
gated, like the lawyer, to protect the client's secrets. Story thus
found the basis of trade secret protection to be the prevention of
breach of trust. Whether looking toward Story's breach of trust
reasoning or Phillips' narrower ground of protecting future pat-
ents, the significance is that neither writer asserted the existence of
property in trade secrets. Indeed Phillips even denied that such
property existed.
The same year that Phillips published his treatise on patents,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided one of the first
American trade secrets cases. This case, Vickery v. Welch,11 2 high-
lighted both the consensus that trade secrets should be protected
and the lack of consensus on the precise grounds and conditions of
that protection. In Vickery the defendant sold his business, com-
plete with goodwill and secrets, to the plaintiff, but continued to
divulge secrets after the sale. The plaintiff sued for an injunction.
In granting the injunction, the court, stated: "[n]ow we cannot per-
ceive the least reason which, after such sale, would enable the de-
fendant lawfully to retain any right in the property or rights sold,
nor any right to convey to strangers, any part of what was to be
transferred to the plaintiff."113 Whether the court meant to call the
trade secret property or whether the court was merely protecting
the trade secret in the same way it was protecting the property
sold is unclear. The latter seems more likely because the court's
authority for protecting the secret was Smith v. Dickenson and
Phillips' treatise, both of which denied that trade secrets were ob-
jects of property. The citation of these authorities in Vickery was
inapposite however because both authorities based protection on
the future patentability of an invention, while in Vickery there was
no indication that the secrets sold were about to be patented.
The lack of consensus on precise grounds and protections of
trade secrets was finally acknowledged by the English court in
Morison v. Moat,""4 decided in 1851. That case involved essentially
the same facts as Yovatt. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
employee had learned their trade secret surreptitiously and they
111. This was the plaintiff's argument; Lord Eldon did not specify it as the ground for
his holding.
112. 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523 (1837).
113. Id. at 526.
114. 9 Hare 241, 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (1851).
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sought an injunction to prevent his further use of the secret. The
court, citing the various grounds used in previous cases to justify
the protection of trade secrets, including property, contract, and
breach of trust, relied on Yovatt and granted the injunction.115
Morison is significant because it recognized, albeit in dictum, that
trade secret protection could be based on property. Despite its un-
documented reference to other cases, Morison appears to have
been the first case on either side of the Atlantic unambiguously to
find property in trade secrets.
The first American decision to recognize property in trade
secrets was the 1866 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case of
Peabody v. Norfolk.11 6 The plaintiff, who had given certain trade
secrets to his employee, the defendant, under a promise not to di-
vulge those secrets to others, sought specific performance of that
promise. After reviewing the protection provided for trade secrets
in the English cases discussed above, with particular attention to
Morison v. Moat, the court held that "a secret art is a legal subject
of property."117 The court granted an injunction and established
the rule for the protection of trade secrets which remained essen-
tially unchanged into the twentieth century: the inventor of a se-
cret, whether the secret is patentable or not, does not have an ex-
clusive right to the secret against the world, but he does have "a
property" in the secret which protects him against any disclosure
constituting a breach of confidence.118 The last two decades of the
nineteenth century witnessed a sudden increase in the number of
trade secrets cases, and all closely followed this rule.11" 9
Trade secrets thus became the object of property rights, al-
though no court ever suggested that such secrets might be abso-
lutely protected. Since limited property had been recognized by
Blackstone, the creation of such property in trade secrets was
hardly a radical decision. Yet, it is still surprising that absolute
protection for trade secrets was never considered, particularly be-
cause the first trade secrets cases were decided contemporaneously
115. 9 Hare at 255, 68 Eng. Rep. at 498.
116. 98 Mass. 452 (1868).
117. Id. at 459-60.
118. Id. at 458.
119. See, e.g., Salomon v. Hertz, 40 N.J. Eq. 400, 2 A. 379 (1886); Chadwick v. Covell,
151 Mass. 190, 23 N.E. 1068 (1890); Simmons Hardware Co. v. Waibel, 1 S.D. 488, 47 N.W.
814 (1891); Stewart v. Hook, 118 Ga. 445, 45 S.E. 369 (1903); Pomeroy Ink Co. v. Pomeroy,
77 N.J. Eq. 293, 78 A. 698 (1910).
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with the first trademark cases. In some cases, the defendant appro-
priated both the trademark and the trade secret from the plaintiff,
requiring a single court to decide the nature of both interests si-
multaneously.120 Theoretically, a court which gave the inventor of
a distinctive symbol the right to exclusive use of the symbol also
could have given the inventor of a valuable process an exclusive
right of use. Courts may have resisted the idea of absolute prop-
erty in trade secrets because of the prior existence of statutory pat-
ent law. The patent provided protection in rem, but for a limited
time and conditioned upon disclosure of the secret. As the court
observed in Morison v. Moat, providing absolute protection for
trade secrets would give the proprietor of the trade secret more
rights than the holder of a patent.121 If the patent was to remain a
valuable grant that could entice inventors to disclose their secrets,
it would have to offer the inventors greater protection than was
available at common law.
Given the limitations on the property rights recognized, the
designation of trade secrets as objects of property rights did not
provide more protection to trade secrets than was available under
the earlier cases. The important question for a court deciding a
trade secret case was whether the defendant had acted wrongly,
not whether the trade secret was property. Finding property-in the
trade secret added nothing to the decision. The U.S. Supreme
Court recognized this disintegration of the meaning of property in
trade secrets in E.I. DuPont DeNemours Powder Co. v. Mas-
land. 1 22 There, the court was asked to restrain the defendant from
using or disclosing secrets he had learned as an employee of the
plaintiff. The defendant claimed there was no secret, and that if
the injunction was granted, the merits would be prejudged as to
the existence of a secret. Justice Holmes, writing for the court,
replied:
The case has been considered as presenting a conflict between a right of
property and a right to make a full defense .... We approach the question
somewhat differently. The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade
secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the
primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good
120. See, e.g., Canham v. Jones, 35 Eng. Rep. 302 (1813); Watkins v. Landon, 52 Minn.
389, 54 N.W. 193 (1893); Chadwick v. Covell, 151 Mass. 190, 23 N.E. 1068 (1890).
121. 9 Hare at 258, 68 Eng. Rep. at 500.
122. 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
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faith. Whether plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows
the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted.
The property may be denied but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the
starting point for the present matter is not property or due process of law,
but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs, or
one of them. 3
The case was decided in accordance with the policy of protecting
confidential relations, without regard to whether the trade secret
was property.
3. Oil and Gas The emergence of an oil and gas industry in
the early nineteenth century thrust upon the courts the need to
develop a theory of property in oil and gas law with little or no
precedent to guide them. The earliest cases had little trouble find-
ing property in oil and gas, perhaps because of the tangible nature
of these minerals. The courts also applied the absolutist concep-
tion of property to these minerals. For example, in Hail v. Reed,
124
the defendant took three barrels of oil from a well on the plaintiff's
land and was sued for recovery of the oil. The plaintiff argued that
the owner of land on which a well is situated "should be considered
as having the exclusive property in all that well contains. 1 25 The
defendant replied that oil "is ever moving"1 26 and therefore should
be analogized to animals ferae naturae, which become the property
of the first person to reduce them to possession. 27 Alternatively,
the defendant argued that oil is analogous to a surface stream and
claimed that no right to the oil existed until the oil had been ap-
propriated. 128 The court seized upon yet another analogy-that of
a spring which arises on one's land-and held that the owner of
the freehold on which the well was located was the exclusive owner
of the oil.129
The nature of oil, however, strained the concept of absolute
rights in property because several landowners who had access to
the same oil could raise competing claims. The Pennsylvania court
in Funk v. Haldeman3 0 considered such competing claims and
123. Id. at 102.
124. 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon. 479) 383 (1854).
125. 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon. at 480) at 384.
126. 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon. at 482-83) at 386.
127. Id.
128. 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon. at 485) at 388.
129. 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon. at 490) at 392-93.
130. 53 Pa. 229 (1866).
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struggled to preserve the absolutist conception of property in oil.
The plaintiff paid the defendants, owners of a farm, $200 for the
right to prospect for oil on a portion of the farm and for the exclu-
sive use of one acre of land around each well; he also agreed to give
the defendants one-third of all the oil he extracted from the land.
After the plaintiff struck oil, the defendants sank their own wells
and the plaintiff sued to enjoin the defendants' drilling. The plain-
tiff argued that the oil pool was indivisible and that the drilling of
other wells diminished his exclusive right.13' As in Hail, the defen-
dants proposed an analogy to streams, claiming that the plaintiff
had a right only to such oil as he possessed.13 2 The court held that
the plaintiff had the exclusive right to drill for oil on the portion of
the farm on which he had the right to prospect. It observed that
the plaintiff already had invested $800,000 in the development of
the well, and then noted that although there was no express stipu-
lation in the agreement that the plaintiff would have the exclusive
right to drill for oil, that was the only fair inference. A contrary
holding would have placed all the risks of exploration on the plain-
tiff, and then, when he struck off, would have allowed the defen-
dants to sink their own wells, rendering the plaintiff's investment
essentially worthless.3 3 The court concluded that the defendants'
right to drill for oil was restricted to the land on which the plaintiff
had no right to prospect. The plaintiff's right to the oil was thus
limited, but only because he had purchased drilling rights for
merely a portion of the farm.
The total inapplicability of the absolutist conception of prop-
erty to oil and gas soon became apparent to the courts. The Funk
court had permitted the defendants to drill on portions of the farm
where the plaintiff had no drilling rights, even though such drilling
could ruin the plaintiff's investment as easily as the prohibited
drilling. Similarly, the Hail court had never suggested that the
plaintiff could prevent drilling into the same pool by others on ad-
joining land, despite the court's references to exclusive ownership.
The exclusive ownership issue was finally confronted directly
in a series of cases involving landowners who had tapped into the
same mineral reservoir. If the value of the investment of both par-
131. Id. at 235.
132. Id. at 236.
133. Id. at 248.
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ties was to be protected, some form of limited property rights was
essential. The solution was to retreat to the analogy, rejected in
Hail, of animals ferae naturae. A new rule was established in
Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. Dewitt,134 that oil
and gas were held to be minerals ferae naturae because they were
not fixed to a particular piece of land. Like animals ferae naturae,
oil and gas would be considered the property of the owner of the
superadjacent land as long as they were in his possession. If an-
other landowner acquired possession of the minerals, however, title
would pass to him. Thus, every landowner was entitled to tap any
oil or gas pool he had access to, regardless of whether others had
already tapped it.
The new rule of minerals ferae naturae quickly became the
majority rule in the United States.135 The theoretically absolute
right to exclude others from tapping a pool had been limited to
exclude only those whose land was not superadjacent to the min-
eral reservoir. The right to use the minerals, however, was still ab-
solute. Any superadjacent landowner was legally entitled to take as
much oil or gas as he could get by any available means. And what
could the other landowners do to protect their interests in the min-
erals? As one court put it: "Nothing, only go and do likewise."1 6
Indeed, an Indiana court held that one could explode nitroglycer-
ine in one's gas well in order to increase the gas flow, even though
that might result in a more rapid depletion of the pool and dimin-
ish the quantity of gas a neighbor could draw before the well was
exhausted.137
The absolute right of usufruct was the next portion of the
owner's property in oil and gas to come under attack. The minerals
ferae naturae rule gave many people access to the same pool, but
failed to limit the methods of extracting the minerals. Thus, it en-
couraged landowners to exhaust a pool as quickly as possible,
before others did, even if such rapid exhaustion entailed enormous
waste. By the turn of the century, the courts had begun to address
the problem of waste. In Manufacturers Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana
Natural Gas & Oil Co.,1 8" the plaintiff, who owned land over a pool
134. 130 Pa. 235, 18 A. 724 (1889).
135. Summers, Property in Oil and Gas, 29 YAmE L.J. 175, 176 (1919).
136. Barnard v. Monongahela Nat. Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 365, 65 A. 801, 802 (1907).
137. People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, 131 Ind. 277, 31 N.E. 59 (1891).
138. 155 Ind. 461, 57 N.E. 912 (1900).
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of gas, sought to enjoin a superadjacent landowner from using
pumps to force gas out of the ground at such a pressure that it
sucked saltwater into the pool, destroying the value of the remain-
ing gas. In granting the injunction, the court reasoned that, al-
though a superadjacent landowner had a property right entitling
him to mine the gas, he had no right to induce an unnatural flow
into his own well or to take any action which might damage the
common reservoir. In other words, the taking of gas from the pool
had to be reasonable.3 9 A similar rule of reason imposed by statute
had been approved by the U.S. Supreme Court14 0 the year before
and other jurisdictions quickly adopted the rule, either by statute
or by judicial decision.1 41 The adoption of a rule of reason was,
however, an abandonment of the superadjacent landowner's abso-
lute right of usufruct in oil and gas. The rule also precluded the
application of any fixed or determinant set of rights in the owner
of property in oil and gas. The rule stated that whether the owner
of such property was entitled to mine the minerals in a particular
way depended on what was reasonable under the circumstances, a
matter for the court to decide based on the policy of preventing
waste or other considerations. Once again, as with trademarks and
trade secrets, the designation of oil and gas as objects of property
did not permit the court to deduce logically the rights of the par-
ties involved. Only considerations of public policy would decide
cases.
III. THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF NEW PROPERTY
By the end of the nineteenth century, Blackstone's conception
of property as absolute dominion over things had become fatally
anachronistic, and was supplanted by a new form of property. This
new property had been dephysicalized and thus consisted not of
rights over things, but of any valuable right. The new property had
also been limited. It consisted not of an absolute or fixed constella-
tion of rights, but of a set of rights which were limited according to
the situation.
Legal commentators were acutely aware of the development of
139. Id. at 469-70, 57 N.E. at 915.
140. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1899).
141. See, e.g., Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 117 Ky. 71, 77 S.W. 368
(1903); Gillespie v. Fulton Oil & Gas Co., 236 IM. 188, 86 N.E. 219 (1908). See also cases
cited in W. SUMMERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS § 63 (1954).
1980]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the new property. Francis J. Swayze, addressing the 1915 graduat-
ing class of the Yale Law School, described the "new kinds of
property of great value. '142 These included business goodwill,
trademarks, trade secrets, common law copyright, going value of
businesses, franchises and equitable easements.143 Similarly, Dean
G. Acheson observed in 1914 that "the all-absorbing legal concep-
tion of the [nineteenth] century [was] that of the property right.
Everything was thought of in terms of property-reputation, pri-
vacy, domestic relations-and as new interests required protection,
their viability depended upon their ability to take on the protec-
tive coloring of property.
'1 44
Lawyers were interested in the new property because of its
personal and commercial importance.1 45 But more than that, the
new property struck the legal imagination because, as Acheson ob-
served, the concept of nonphysical and limited property seemed
capable of embracing every valuable interest known to the law.
Among the interests that the courts held to constitute property
were, in addition to those listed by Swayze, the right to use the
mail system, 46 the right of an employer to a free flow of labor,1'7
the right of an employee to free access to employment,1 48 the right
.of a stockholder to vote for all the directors of a corporation,149 the
right to a tax exemption,150 the right to prohibit others from selling
142. Swayze, The Growing Law, 25 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1915).
143. Id. at 10-11.
144. Acheson, Book Review, 33 HAnv. L. REv. 329, 330 (1919).
145. The legal community was acutely aware of the commercial importance of the new
property. For example, the reporter of Coats v. Holbrook, 2 Sand. Ch. (N.Y.) 586 (1845), one
of the earliest American cases finding property in trademarks, added a footnote to the case,
observing that:
The great interest felt in these questions by the manufacturing and commercial
world, is illustrated by the fact, that the judgment. . . in Coats v. Holbrook,
was noticed at some length in the London Times soon after it was pronounced,
and was stated at large in the Liverpool newspapers.
Id. at 587.
146. Hoover v. McChesney, 81 F. 472 (1897). See 11 HARv. L. REV. 265 (1897).
147. See Comment, A New Approach to Labor Problems, 37 YALE L.J. 249, 252 (1927)
and cases cited therein.
148. Id.
149. Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 47 Misc. 187, 94 N.Y.S. 65 (1905). See 19
HkRv. L. Rav. 62 (1905).
150. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912). See also Goodnow, Exemptions from Taxa-
tion as Property Under the 5th and 14th Amendments, 12 COLUM. L. Rav. 724 (1912);
Goodnow, The Nature of Tax Exemptions, 13 COLUM. L. Rav. 104 (1913).
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news one has gathered, 51 the right of a building owner to use an
elevator,152 the right to membership in a stock exchange, 53 the
right to use of a church pew,1'5 and the right to control the disposi-
tion of a dead body.15 5 The increasing awareness of legal commen-
tators that a vast body of property rights was being created which
did not fit Blackstone's physicalist or absolutist conceptions ren-
dered Blackstone increasingly obsolete. The exceptions had en-
gulfed the rule.
In a pair of articles published in 1913 and 1917, Wesley New-
comb Hohfeld presented a conceptual scheme for analyzing the
new property. 5 Hohfeld identified eight fundamental legal rela-
tions which formed the constituent elements of property. 5 7 Each
of these fundamental legal relations was defined relative to its op-
posite and correlative. The juxtaposition of these relations pro-
duced the following scheme:
Jural right privilege power immunity
Opposites no right duty disability liability
Jural right privilege power immunity
Correlatives duty no right liability disability
Hohfeld believed that these eight legal relations were "the lowest
151. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); Nat. Tel. News
Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 35 Chicago Legal News 89 (1902). See also Note, 18 COLUM.
L. REv. 257 (1918); 32 H'Iv. L. REv. 566 (1919); Comment, 12 YALE L.J. 97 (1902); Com-
ment, The Associated Press Case, 28 YALE L.J. 387 (1919).
152. People v. Sheridan, 186 A.D. 211, 174 N.Y.S. 327 (2d Dept. 1919). See also 28
YALE L.J. 605 (1919).
153. See Nashua Say. Bank v. Abbott, 63 N.E. 1058 (Mass. 1902) and 16 HARV. L. REV.
70 (1902).
154. See Gay v. Baker, 17 Mass. 435 (1821); Church v. Wells's Ex'rs, 24 Pa. 249 (1855);
Zollmann, Pew Rights in the American Law, 25 YALE L.J. 467 (1916).
155. Dead bodies are variously described by the cases as both property and quasi-prop-
erty. See 20 YALE L.J. 663 (1911); 17 YALE L.J. 295 (1908); 13 HARv. L. REv. 63 (1899); 10
HAxv. L. REV. 51 (1896).
156. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing, 23 Y=LE L.J. 16 (1913); Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judi-
cial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
157. Hohfeld's attempt to describe law by analyzing terms was part of a tradition of
analytical jurisprudence dating back to John Austin in the early nineteenth century. The
emphasis on terminology increased around the beginning of the twentieth century, when the
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common denominators of the law," 1 8 and that any legal relation-
ship could be expressed as the sum of some combination of these
eight denominators. To say that one owned property was to say
that the owner had some set of rights, privileges, powers, and im-
munities. Moreover, one who did not own property had a set of no
rights, duties, disabilities, and liabilities relative to the owner.
Hohfeld's conception of property differed from Blackstone's in
two crucial respects. To begin with, Hohfeld banished the need for
things from property law. The obsession of old property with
things had been manifested in three ways. First, at various times,
Blackstone had equated property with things. Corporeal heredita-
ments (land), for example, were things while incorporeal heredita-
ments (rights) were reified so that they too were considered things.
Hohfeld criticized the equation of property with things: "Since all
legal interests are 'incorporeal'-consisting, as they do, of more or
less limited aggregates of abstract legal relations-such a supposed
contrast as that sought to be drawn by Blackstone can but serve to
mislead .... ,,159 Property according to Hohfeld consisted of legal
relations, not things. Where Blackstone's insistence on things had
caused him to reify incorporeal hereditaments, Hohfeld's reaction
made him insist that only rights could be property. Blackstone, at
other times, equated property not with things, but with rights over
things. This was the second manifestation of the old property's ob-
session with things. Hohfeld also disputed this definition of prop-
erty by arguing that legal relations were between people, not be-
tween people and things.160 Hohfeld, by denying that property was
things or rights over things, had rejected both of the plausible in-
terpretations of Blackstone's definition of property. Whether prop-
erty was the thing or the right over the thing, Blackstone had
made clear that property could exist only in relation to some thing.
Hohfeld rejected even this minimal association with tangible ob-
jects, arguing that property could exist whether or not there was
any tangible thing to serve as the object of the rights.161 Hohfeld's
meaningfulness of legal terms, such as property, was disintegrating. See, e.g., Corbin, Legal
Analysis and Terminology, 29 YAE L.J. 163 (1919); Corbin, Jural Relations and Their
Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 226 (1921); Harno, Tort-Relations, 30 YALE L.J. 145 (1920).
158. 23 YALE L.J. 16, 58.
159. Id. at 24.
160. 26 YALE L.J. at 721.
161. Id. at 738-39.
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conception of property was completely dephysicalized.
The second crucial difference between Hohfeld's and Black-
stone's conceptions of property was that the dominion of the owner
of Hohfeldian property was not absolute or fixed. Property con-
sisted of a set of legal relations, but not necessarily any particular
set. Hohfeld denounced the tendency to lump together under blan-
ket terms the multiplicity of legal relations that might exist be-
tween the property owner and others.' This was exemplified by
the owner of land in fee simple,6 s whose property actually con-
sisted of a complex aggregate of rights, privileges, powers, and im-
munities against other persons. Hohfeld urged that these different
legal relations not be confused with one another. The owner might,
for example, alienate some portion of his rights to the land without
affecting the remaining aggregate of relations. By breaking prop-
erty into its constituent parts, Hohfeld both demonstrated that
property does not imply any absolute or fixed set of rights in the
owner and provided a vocabulary for describing the limited nature
of the owner's property.
Hohfeld's conception of the new property gained broad ac-
ceptance among other legal commentators. " A.L. Corbin, writing
in 1922, observed that "[olur concept of property has shifted; in-
corporeal rights have become property. And finally, 'property' has
ceased to describe any res, or object of sense at all, and has become
merely a bundle of legal relations-rights, powers, privileges, im-
munities."'I 5 The complete acceptance of the Hohfeldian concep-
tion of property by the American legal establishment was signaled
162. Id. at 746.
163. Id.
164. Hobfeld's scheme was not automatically accepted by all legal commentators, and it
became part of the general debate over terminology. See text accompanying note 170 infra.
The Yale Law School immediately embraced Hohfeld's analysis. See text accompanying
note 170 infra. Two professors in particular, Walter Wheeler Cook and Arthur L. Corbin,
dedicated themselves to spreading the good news of Hohfeldian analysis. See Corbin, supra,
note 157. The YALE LAw JOURNAL published many articles applying Hohfeld's system to
various legal problems involving property. Volume 28 of the JOURNAL, for example, con-
tained the following articles: Comment, What Constitutes an "Injury" to "Real" Property,
28 YALE L.J. 171 (1918); Comment, Conversion by Innocent Agents, id. at 175; Comment,
Competition of Trolleys and Unlicensed Jitneys, id. at 485; Comment, The Associated
Press Case, id. at 387; Note, What Constitutes "Injury to Property", id. at 605; Note, Right
to Work in One's Own Business, id. at 707; Note, Hohfeld's Contribution to the Science of
Law, id. at 721; Note, Restraining Interference with Office, id. at 838.
165. Comment, Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE L.J. 429 (1922).
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by the promulgation of the American Law Institute's Restatement
of Property in 1936. The word "property" is not included among
the terms defined by the Restatement. Instead, the Restatement
defines the four constituent elements of property: rights, privileges,
powers, and immunities, with their correlatives: duties, no rights,
liabilities, and disabilities.168
Once property was reconceived to include potentially any val-
uable interest, there was no logical stopping point. Property could
include all legal relations. Indeed Hohfeld had insisted that his
eight fundamental legal relations were "the lowest common
demoninators" of all legal relationships. As one court put it: "The
word [property], as here used, is intended to embrace every species
of valuable right and interest, and whatever tends in any degree,
no matter how small, to deprive one of that right, or interest, de-
prives him of property. ' '11 7
Such an explosion of the concept of property threatened to
render the term absolutely meaningless in two ways. First, if prop-
erty included all legal relations, then it could no longer serve to
distinguish one set of legal relations from another. It would lose its
meaning as a category of law. Second, the greater the variety of
interests that were protected as property, the more difficult it
would be to assert that all property should be protected to the
same degree. The pressure to create new species of property pro-
tected in different ways would be intense, so that the designation
of some interest as property would no longer indicate any fixed
protection. Consequently, property would cease to distinguish one
kind of legal relation from another and fail to distinguish with any
clarity legally protected interests from other interests. The inabil-
ity of property to distinguish one kind of legal relation from an-
other was illustrated by the law of trade secrets. The creation of
property in trade secrets did not change the nature of the legal
protection. The inability of property to distinguish legally pro-
tected interests from other interests was illustrated by the law of
trademarks during the first quarter of the twentieth century. At
that time, the protection available to trademarks was arranged on
a continuum, from essentially no legal protection, to absolute pro-
tection. Knowing that a symbol was a trademark and therefore
166. American Law Institute, Restatement of Property §§ 1-4 (1936).
167. People v. Warden, 145 A.D. 861, 863, 130 N.Y.S. 698, 700 (lst Dep't 1911).
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property did not determine the symbol's position on that
continuum.
The destruction of meaning in the concept of property de-
stroyed the concept's apparent power to decide cases. As one com-
mentator observed: "Does not property mean anything of value to
the individual? If so, any legal relation is in effect property. This
but emphasizes the point that the term is too inclusive to be of
assistance in solving most disputed points." e Walter Wheeler
Cook noted this problem in relation to general expressions such as
"property in news" or "quasiproperty" which he argued were too
vague to be of assistance in deciding legal disputes. To Cook, the
more useful questions were what rights, privileges, powers, and im-
munities did the newsgatherer have regarding the news, and
against whom did he have them?169
Pressure thus mounted to find some way of containing the ex-
pansion of property. The strategy adopted was to concede that
while any valuable interest could be property, it would not neces-
sarily be considered property merely because it was valuable. A
court would consider such an interest to be property only if public
policy so demanded. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in International
News Service v. Associated Press,1 0  summarized the new
approach:
But the fact that a product of the mind has cost its producer money and
labor, and has a value for which others are willing to pay, is not sufficient to
insure to it this legal attribute of property. The general rule of law is, that
the noblest of human productions-knowledge, truths ascertained, concep-
tions, and ideas-become, after voluntary communication to others, free as
the air to common use. Upon these incorporeal productions the attribute of
property is continued after such communication only in certain cases where
public policy has seemed to demand it.17 1
Justice Holmes, dissenting in the same case, restated the argument
more consisely: "Property, a creation of law, does not arise from
value, although exchangeable-a matter of fact. Many exchangea-
ble values may be destroyed intentionally without compensation.
Property depends upon exclusion by law from interference
168. Comment, Adverse Possession of One's Own Debt, 29 YALE L.J. 91, 94 n. 16
(1919).
169. Comment, The Associated Press Case, supra note 164 at 388-89 (1919).
170. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). The issue was whether one could have property rights in
news.
171. Id. at 250.
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Holmes and Brandeis were saying that property was what the
law said it was. But positivism was nothing new; Blackstone had a
positivist streak. The real significance of the Holmes-Brandeis po-
sition was that they were also denying that law had produced a
self-limiting definition of property. Some valuable interests were
property and some were not. The basis for distinguishing the two
categories was not anything in the definition of property, but pub-
lic policy. Holmes and Brandeis had stopped the seemingly limit-
less expansion of property, but at the price of admitting that there
was no inevitability in the definition of property. In effect, the de-
termination of whether an interest was property was not one of
logic, but of politics. As one writer noted, ". . . the difficulty that
causes such a volume of disagreement is the chameleon character
of the term 'property right' or 'vested right': the fact that it is not
an absolute standard, but a variant which each man, layman, legis-
lator, and judge, determines individually out of his own
background." 173
Deciding whether an interest was property was only half the
problem. Courts still had to decide what kind of property it was. In
other words, what kind of jural relations with other persons did the
owner of the property have? The answer could not be deduced
from the word property, since property had come to embrace so
many different forms of limited rights, or from the nature of the
thing involved, since often no thing was involved. The discussion
of the law of trademarks, oil and gas, and trade secrets indicates
how, in each case, the creation of property in these interests failed
to provide a premise from which the result of a dispute could be
logically deduced. The question of what rights resided in the owner
could be answered only in the same way as the question of whether
property existed at all could be answered-through public policy.
The general approach of the legal community in the first quar-
ter of the twentieth century to the problem of defining the nature
of property rights in a particular case is captured by two case com-
ments published in 1919. The first comment discussed the case of
Rorabank v. Motion Picture Operators' Union of Minneapolis.17 4
172. Id. at 246.
173. Note, The Variable Quality of a Vested Right, 34 YALE L.J. 303, 309 (1925).
174. 140 Minn. 481, 168 N.W. 766 (1918).
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The court had held that a union may not force a theatre owner
who works in his own theatre to replace himself with union mem-
bers. The writer observed:
The majority opinion argues that the [owner's] rights against the [union]
arise from the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. These certainly
confer an immunity upon all citizens, from certain interferences by state gov-
ernmental agencies. But such immunity does not carry with it, as a logical
necessity, rights in one citizen against other individuals. It may well be that
public policy at times requires the co-existence of such rights with the immu-
nities in question, but the fact should be borne in mind that the requirement
is not one of logic, but one of policy, to be determined in each case.17 5
That the right to work was property, which included protection
against government interference, did not mean that it also in-
cluded protection against individual interference. Whether prop-
erty in one's own labor included the latter protection was a ques-
tion of public policy.
The second case comment discussed Puget Sound Traction,
Light & Power Co. v. Grassmeyer.76 The court had held that a
trolley company with a franchise to operate could seek an injunc-
tion against the operator of unlicensed jitneys because illegal oper-
ation of the jitneys infringed upon the trolley company's property
in its franchise. The writer commented:
Granted that, as the court said, "the franchise is property and any unlawful
interference therewith is actionable," we still need to know just what this so-
called property is and how it can be "interfered with," lawfully or unlawfully
.... Upon analysis the "franchise" of the plaintiff to lay tracks, operate
trolley cars, etc., upon the public highways is seen to be a complex aggregate
of jural relations, consisting, inter alia, of: (1) privileges against people gener-
ally to do these things; (2) rights against people generally that they shall not
interfere with the doing of these things .... The real question, therefore, is,
whether such a "franchise" ought to be held to include rights against unli-
censed persons that they refrain from competing with the plaintiff. Ulti-
mately, this question must be decided on grounds of policy which the use of
vague language can only serve to conceal.1 77
By the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century, the
legal community knew there was no inevitability in the definition
of property, or in the legal consequences of something's being des-
175. Note, Right to Work in One's Own Business, supra note 164 at 708 (citations
omitted).
176. 102 Wash. 482, 173 P. 504 (1918).
177. Note, Competition of Trolleys and Unlicensed Jitneys, supra note 165 at 487.
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ignated as property. Both determinations were matters not of logi-
cal deduction, but of political choice.
CONCLUSION
The creation of the new property can be understood from two
perspectives. From the perspective of the treatise writer, who seeks
to assimilate and rationalize case holdings, the rise of the new
property was merely an expansion and a transformation of the con-
cept of property. Property was, first of all, dephysicalized so that it
could protect any valuable interest, not just things. Moreover,
property rights were seen not as rights over things, but rights be-
tween people. Second, property was limited, so that the owner of
some valuable interest no longer exercised absolute control over
other people with respect to that interest. Indeed, the term "prop-
erty" did not imply any particular set of rights over others. Rather,
the particular combination of rights that comprised property in a
given case would be decided according to the circumstances. Thus,
the treatise writer could conclude that the result of this process of
expansion and transformation was that property protected many
more and different interests in 1925 than in 1765 and that the pro-
tection was of a variable rather than a fixed nature.
The rise of the new property, however, can also be understood
from the perspective of the jurisprudent, who seeks to identify the
sources and justifications of the legal order. From that perspective,
the process of expansion and transformation of the concept of
property accomplished two things. First, it demonstrated that
there was nothing inevitable about the definition of property. That
is, property law could not be logically deduced from the nature of
things. Second, the broad and variable nature of the new property
destroyed the fixed meaning of the concept, so the results of cases
could no longer be deduced from the nature of the property rights.
Thus, by 1925, it was abundantly clear that the definition and ap-
plication of the concept of property could not be done through log-
ical deduction. The courts avoided paralysis by deciding cases ac-
cording to public policy. Property was completely positivized. The
concept was defined and applied in whatever manner the courts
thought expedient of public policy. But this solution to the prob-
lem of dispute resolution came at the price of the courts' legiti-
macy. For if judges were not bound by precedent, then nothing was
to prevent them from injecting their own political opinions into
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decisions. The "government of laws, and not of men" 178 which had
seemed so clearly to exist in 1803 had been exposed as, in truth, a
government of "nine old men." The creation of the new property
was, in microcosm, the destruction of the rule of law.
178. Chief Justice Marshall used this phrase to describe the government of the United
States in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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